Functional safety with ISO 13849-1

Most robot safeguards depend on a control system working correctly at the moment it is needed. A light curtain is useless if the relay behind it has welded contacts; an interlocked gate is useless if the robot controller ignores the signal. Functional safety is the part of overall safety that depends on safety-related control systems functioning correctly in response to their inputs. ISO 13849-1, Safety of machinery: Safety-related parts of control systems, Part 1: General principles for design, is the most widely used machinery standard for it, and its fourth edition was published in 2023. ROB-440 lesson 8 introduced performance levels, the risk graph and the addition of PFHd values along a chain. This lesson works through the full method behind the numbers: specifying safety functions, choosing architectures, calculating mean time to dangerous failure from component data, diagnostic coverage and common cause failure, and reading off the achieved performance level. The calculations are simplified for teaching; real designs use the standard's tables and validated tools such as SISTEMA.

Safety functions and their specification

A safety function is a function of a machine whose failure can result in an immediate increase of risk. Typical robot safety functions include safety-related stop on opening an interlocked guard, safety-related stop when a light curtain or scanner field is entered, prevention of unexpected start-up, safely limited speed, safely limited position or zone, monitored standstill, enabling device function and emergency stop. Each function is implemented by safety-related parts of the control system (SRP/CS): input devices, logic and output devices, plus the wiring and software that connect them.

The 2023 edition puts more weight on writing a safety requirements specification before design. For each safety function, the specification should state what triggers it, what the machine must do and how quickly, the required performance level (PLr), the operating modes in which it is active, how it is reset, what happens on loss of power, the interaction with other functions, and the environmental conditions. A vague specification such as stop the robot when the gate opens hides important choices: stop category 0 or 1, whether the gate should be locked until standstill, whether the robot may restart automatically when the gate closes (it should not, for a guard that people can walk through), and what happens if a door switch fails.

Determining the required performance level

The required performance level is determined from the risk assessment using parameters for severity (S1 slight, normally reversible injury; S2 serious, normally irreversible injury or death), frequency and duration of exposure (F1 seldom to less often or short; F2 frequent to continuous or long), and possibility of avoiding the hazard or limiting harm (P1 possible under specific conditions; P2 scarcely possible). The risk graph, which ROB-440 showed, turns these into PLr a to e. The 2023 edition retains the graph and gives more guidance on choosing the parameters, including that the probability of a hazardous event occurring may justify lowering the PLr by one level in some situations, provided the reasoning is documented. Severity is never lowered by the existence of the safeguard being designed, since the purpose is to find out how good that safeguard must be.

Architectures: the categories

ISO 13849-1 describes designated architectures, called categories, that set the structure and fault behaviour of the SRP/CS. The category is not a quality grade on its own. It combines with component reliability, diagnostics and protection against common cause failure to determine the performance level achieved.

Well-tried components are those widely used in the past with successful results in similar applications, or made according to principles that show suitability and reliability, such as switches with positive opening contacts to IEC 60947-5-1, whose contacts are forced apart mechanically even if they weld. A single channel of well-tried components can be good enough for moderate risks, but cannot detect its own faults. For PL d and e, redundancy with monitoring is the usual answer.

Mean time to dangerous failure

MTTFd is the expected mean time before a component fails in a way that defeats the safety function. Electronic components have constant failure rates given by manufacturers, often as a dangerous failure rate \( \lambda_D \) per hour, with \( \mathrm{MTTF_D} = 1/\lambda_D \). Electromechanical, pneumatic and mechanical components wear with use, so their reliability is given as B10d, the number of operations after which 10 per cent of a sample has failed dangerously. The standard converts B10d to MTTFd using the number of operations per year.

Here \( d_{op} \) is days of operation per year, \( h_{op} \) hours per day and \( t_{cycle} \) the mean time in seconds between operations of the component. A component should also not be used beyond \( T_{10D} = B_{10D}/n_{op} \) years, after which it must be replaced, which becomes a maintenance requirement in the manual. For a channel made of several components in series, the failure rates add, so the channel MTTFd follows from summing reciprocals. ISO 13849-1 classifies channel MTTFd as low (3 years to under 10), medium (10 to under 30) and high (30 to 100 years); values above 100 years are capped at 100 for the calculation, with a higher cap of 2,500 years allowed for category 4.

When the two channels of a redundant architecture differ, they are combined into one equivalent value using the symmetrization formula from the standard.

Here A and B are the MTTFd values of the two channels after capping.

Diagnostic coverage

Diagnostic coverage (DC) is the fraction of dangerous failures that diagnostics detect. A safety relay that checks whether both channels of an interlock switch change state together detects many faults, such as one contact welding or a wire short to supply. A contactor with mirror contacts fed back to the logic allows detection of a welded main contact before the next start. ISO 13849-1 tables give DC values for typical measures: none (below 60 per cent), low (60 to under 90), medium (90 to under 99) and high (99 per cent or more). For a whole function, an average is taken, weighted by failure rates.

A subtle point concerns several interlock switches wired in series to one safety relay input pair, a common and cheap arrangement on large cells with many doors. If one switch develops a fault and a different door is then opened, the relay may see a normal change and miss the fault, an effect called fault masking. ISO/TR 24119 explains how fault masking reduces the diagnostic coverage that can be claimed, often to low or none, depending on how many doors are typically opened together and how many switches are in series. For higher PLs, switches with individual diagnostics or safety network connections are preferred.

Common cause failure

Redundancy helps only if both channels do not fail together from the same cause, such as a voltage surge, overheating, contamination or a design error duplicated in both channels. For categories 2, 3 and 4, ISO 13849-1 requires a minimum score of 65 out of 100 points on its checklist of measures against common cause failure (CCF).

Putting it together

With the category, the MTTFd of each channel, DCavg and the CCF score, the simplified procedure of ISO 13849-1 gives the achieved PL from a chart, and Annex K of the standard tabulates the corresponding PFHd values. Software such as SISTEMA performs the same calculation for each subsystem and combines subsystems along the chain, which is where ROB-440's addition of PFHd values comes in. The following example applies the calculation steps by hand to a dual-channel gate interlock.

# ISO 13849-1 style calculation for a dual-channel gate interlock (simplified)
def nop(days, hours, t_cycle_s):
    return days * hours * 3600 / t_cycle_s
def mttfd_from_b10d(b10d, n):
    return b10d / (0.1 * n)
def channel(mttfds, cap=100):
    return min(cap, 1 / sum(1 / m for m in mttfds))
def symmetrize(a, b):
    return 2 / 3 * (a + b - 1 / (1 / a + 1 / b))
n_gate = nop(230, 16, 900)          # gate opened every 15 minutes
n_cont = nop(230, 16, 120)          # contactors switch every 2 minutes (cycle stops)
parts = {   # name: (MTTFd in years, DC)
    "switch 1": (mttfd_from_b10d(2.0e6, n_gate), 0.99),
    "switch 2": (mttfd_from_b10d(2.0e6, n_gate), 0.99),
    "relay ch1": (150.0, 0.99),
    "relay ch2": (150.0, 0.99),
    "contactor 1": (mttfd_from_b10d(1.3e6, n_cont), 0.99),
    "contactor 2": (mttfd_from_b10d(1.3e6, n_cont), 0.99),
}
for k, (m, dc) in parts.items():
    print(f"{k:12s} MTTFd = {m:8.1f} y  DC = {dc:.0%}")
ch1 = channel([parts["switch 1"][0], parts["relay ch1"][0], parts["contactor 1"][0]])
ch2 = channel([parts["switch 2"][0], parts["relay ch2"][0], parts["contactor 2"][0]])
m = symmetrize(ch1, ch2)
dcavg = sum(dc / mt for mt, dc in parts.values()) / sum(1 / mt for mt, _ in parts.values())
ccf = 15 + 0 + 15 + 5 + 5 + 5 + 25 + 10      # no diversity claimed
band = "high" if m >= 30 else "medium" if m >= 10 else "low"
dcband = "high" if dcavg >= 0.99 else "medium" if dcavg >= 0.90 else "low" if dcavg >= 0.60 else "none"
print(f"channel MTTFd: {ch1:.1f} y and {ch2:.1f} y; combined {m:.1f} y ({band})")
print(f"DCavg = {dcavg:.1%} ({dcband}); CCF score = {ccf} (>= 65 required)")

switch 1     MTTFd =   1358.7 y  DC = 99%
switch 2     MTTFd =   1358.7 y  DC = 99%
relay ch1    MTTFd =    150.0 y  DC = 99%
relay ch2    MTTFd =    150.0 y  DC = 99%
contactor 1  MTTFd =    117.8 y  DC = 99%
contactor 2  MTTFd =    117.8 y  DC = 99%
channel MTTFd: 62.9 y and 62.9 y; combined 62.9 y (high)
DCavg = 99.0% (high); CCF score = 80 (>= 65 required)

The contactors switch far more often than the gate switches, because the robot is stopped at every cycle in this design, so their MTTFd is lower and dominates each channel. The combined MTTFd is still high, the average diagnostic coverage is high because every component is monitored, and the CCF score exceeds 65. For a category 3 architecture with high MTTFd and at least medium DCavg, the simplified procedure gives PL e, comfortably meeting a PLr of d. If the switches had been wired in series with switches on other doors, fault masking could reduce the DC claimed for them, and the result would need to be recalculated.

Beyond the numbers, ISO 13849-1 requires systematic measures: following basic and well-tried safety principles, managing software development, avoiding errors in specification and design, and validating under ISO 13849-2. Safety-related software has its own requirements, which increase with PL: a documented life cycle following a V-model, coding standards, restricted languages and libraries, reviews and testing. Most robot users write application software in a safety PLC's restricted language with certified function blocks, which reduces but does not remove the need for disciplined verification. Lesson 4 covers validation and the alternative IEC 62061 approach.